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Abstrat: Last years have seen a dramati inrease in the use of omponent platforms, not
only in lassial appliation servers, but also more and more in the domain of Embedded
Systems. The OSGi
tm
platform is one of these platforms dediated to lightweight exeution
environments, and one of the most prominent. However, new platforms also imply new
seurity aws, and a lak of both knowledge and tools for proteting the exposed systems.
This tehnial report aims at fostering the understanding of seurity mehanisms in
omponent deployment. It fouses on seuring the deployment of omponents. It presents
the ryptographi mehanisms neessary for signing OSGi
tm
bundles, as well as the detailed
proess of bundle signature and validation.
We also present the SFelix platform, whih is a seure extension to Felix OSGi
tm
frame-
work implementation. It inludes our implementation of the bundle signature proess, as
speied by OSGi
tm
Release 4 Seurity Layer. Moreover, a tool for signing and publishing
bundles, SFelix JarSigner, has been developed to onveniently integrate bundle signature in
the bundle deployment proess.
Key-words: OSGi
tm
, Seurity, Integrity, Authentiation, Jar Signature, Digital Signature,
Felix.
∗
This Work is partialy founded by Muse IST Projet n°026442.
Déploiement séurisé de omposants pour la plate-forme
OSGi
tm
Release 4
Résumé : L'utilisation de plates-formes à omposants a onnu es dernières années une
forte roissane, en partiulier dans le domaine des Systèmes Embarqués. La plate-forme
OSGi
tm
est une de es plates-formes dédiées aux environnements légers. Cependant, la mise
en oeuvre de nouvelles plates-formes implique la présene de nouveaux risques de séurité,
ainsi qu'un manque à la fois de onnaissane et d'outils pour palier à es nouveaux risques.
Ce rapport tehnique a pour objetif d'améliorer la ompréhension des méanismes de
séurité dans le adre du déploiement de omposants. Il se onentre sur la problématique
de la séurisation du déploiement. Il présente les méanismes de ryptographie néessaires à
la signature des omposants OSGi
tm
(appelés bundles), et le proessus détaillé de signature
et de validation de es bundles.
Nous présentons également la plate-forme SFelix, qui est une implémentation sûre du
framework OSGi
tm
basée sur le projet Apahe Felix. SFelix omprend notre implémentation
du proessus de validation de bundles, onforme à la spéiation OSGi
tm
release 4. De
plus, un outil de signature et de publiation de bundle SFelix JarSigner, a été développé de
manière à intégrer la séurisation des bundles dans le proessus de déploiement.
Mots-lés : OSGi
tm
, Séurité, Intégrité, Authentiation, Signature de Jar, Signature
Numérique, Felix.
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1 Introdution
1.1 Context of this Report
The OSGi
tm
platform is an exeution layer over the Java Virtual Mahine that supports life
yle management of omponents (introdution, update, removal) during runtime. These
omponents provide Java pakages or loally published servies (as Java interfaes) to other
omponents.
This tehnial report aims at fostering the understanding of seurity mehanisms in the
OSGi
tm
platform. It fouses on seuring the deployment of omponents. It presents the
ryptographi mehanisms neessary for signing OSGi
tm
omponents (also named bundles),
as well as the detailed proess of bundle signature and validation.
We present the SFelix platform
1
, whih is a seure extension to Apahe Felix
2
OSGi
tm
framework implementation. It inludes our implementation of the bundle validation proess
in OSGi
tm
Release 4 Seurity Layer. Moreover, a tool for signing and publishing bundles,
SFelix JarSigner, has been developed to onveniently integrate bundle signature in the bundle
deployment proess.
1.2 Component Deployment
The deployment of bundles is not dened by the OSGi
tm
speiations. In the Felix imple-
mentation, it is realized by the publiation of the bundles on a server on the Internet, and
the installation of these bundles from the server by the lient platforms. The steps of the
deployment proess are the following: publiation (1), bundle disovery (2), download (3),
installation (4) and update (4.b), exeution (5). The gure 1 shows this proess of bundle
deployment.
Figure 1: The Component Deployment Proess
1
http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr
2
http://inubator.apahe.org/felix/
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1.3 Threats during Deployment
Major seurity threats during deployment are of three types. The rst type is the presene
of maliious bundle publiation servers. The seond type of deployment threats is man-in-
the-middle attak. Suh an attaker an modify the bundle, or fully substitute the loaded
bundle by another one. In both ases the lient platform installs then exeutes some ode
without being able to do any assumption about the ode quality or reliability. The third
type of threats is the possibility that exists for an attaker to aess and modify (=to
tamper) the stored data used by the omponent platform. Atually, all onguration data
and installed omponents are available on the lesystem of the host, and aess to this
lesystem is suient to fully ontrol the behavior of the platform and of the omponents.
So as to protet the omponent platform from the rst two threats, it is neessary to
ontrol that the bundle publishers are trustworthy, and that loaded bundles have not been
tampered with during the transfer over an untrusted network, suh as the Internet. Jar
speiations (bundles are spei Jar arhives) propose to sign arhive so as to guarantee
suh properties. OSGi
tm
speiations propose additional restritions to signing, notably
by forbidding unomplete arhive signing, whih allows a third party to add resoures to an
arhive without invalidating the signature.
The protetion of the platform resoures requires to integrate a seure lesystem with the
omponent platform. Bundle substitution or onguration tampering between download and
starting is then prevented. As far as it does not deal diretly with the problem of seuring
the deployment proess, this extension of the platform will not be onsidered further in this
report.
Figure 2 shows the seurity threats that exist during the deployment proess of a om-
ponent.
Figure 2: The Seurity Threats during the Component Deployment Proess
INRIA
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1.4 Maliious Bundles
The maliious bundles an be ategorized aording to the target of their attaks, and
aording to the attak paradigm they use, that is to say the type of event that triggers the
attak.
Attak Targets Maliious bundles an be lassied in four main types aording to the
target of the attak they perform:
1. Threat to the System, for instane, a bundle an ontain JNI alls whih makes it
possible to aess the underlying Operating System; or it an have extremely resoure
intensive servies whih onsume most of the available CPU or memory of the system,
2. Threat to the Platform, a bundle an try and aess the Java platform (through the
System or Runtime lasses), or the OSGi
tm
platform,
3. Threat to the Bundles, a bundle an misuse available servies (depending of the ser-
vie API), or provide false servies, that provides a given servie with an improper
implementation,
4. Undue Monitoring, a bundle an gather data related to a platform without making
immediate use of them, and send them to a remote attaker for latter intrusion.
Attak paradigms Three main attak paradigms an be used by maliious bundles. They
are haraterized by the event that triggers the attak:
1. Bak doors. Those bundles make it possible for a remote attaker to gain aess to
the exeution platform.
2. Maliious servies. those bundles provide fake servies or lasses that an be used
instead of valid ones.
3. Autonomous bundles. those bundles perform maliious ations autonomously, without
remote ontrol and without requiring servie alls from other servies. Their behavior
is lose to the one of viruses.
It is of ourse possible that a maliious bundle uses several of these attak paradigms
simultaneously.
This brief presentation of the attaks that may our through maliious OSGi
tm
bundles
highlights the need for seuring the life yle of the bundles, and partiularly for proteting
the deployment phase from maliious Bundle Repositories, from bundle substitution during
transfer or from loal tampering during the installation phase.
This tehnial report presents the mehanisms that are neessary to implement the bun-
dle signature and validation proess. First, underlying ryptographi onepts are presented.
Then, the algorithms for signing and validating an OSGi
tm
bundle are detailed. And, lastly,
RT n° 0323
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our implementation of bundle signature proess is presented. It is made of the SFelix plat-
form - an extension of Apahe Felix OSGi
tm
implementation- on the rst hand, and of SFelix
JarSigner tool - that supports signing and publiation of bundles- on the other hand.
INRIA
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2 Cryptographi Conepts and Standards
Seurity of systems is the ability of these systems to withstand the behavior of maliious
users. It an be dened as the onjuntion of integrity, availability for authorized users only,
and ondentiality [AJB00℄. Identiation of authorized users is named authentiation.
Seure bundle deployment means that these requirements are guaranteed during the
whole deployment proess, that is to say from the publiation of a bundle until the time
when this bundle is started. It is based on asymmetri, or publi key, ryptography, whih
publily binds a given key pair with a unique user. This pair is made of a seret private key
owned by the user and of a publi key that is widely available. The private key is used to
enrypt data. Every third party user an then assert that data that are deryptable with
the publi key have been enrypted with the private one.
For eah of the seurity requirements that have been dened, a denition will be given, the
ryptographi mehanisms neessary for their enforement will be presented, and supporting
standards will be introdued.
2.1 Integrity
Integrity is dened by [AJB00℄ as the absene of improper system state alterations. In
the deployment proess, this means that loaded bundles must not be modied between the
publiation step and the start step.
2.1.1 Digital Signature
A `Digital Signature' is an eletroni signature that an be used to ensure that the original
ontent of the message or doument that has been sent is unhanged, and to authentiate
the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a doument. That is to say a
digital signature guarantees both the integrity of the doument and the authentiation of its
emitter. We will onentrate in these setion on integrity. Authentiation will be presented
in details in setion 2.2.
The overview of the proess of digital signature is shown in gure 3.
Figure 3: Digital Signature of a Doument using asymmetri Cryptography
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This proess an be shared in two separate steps: the signature generation (A) by the
emitter of the signed doument, and the signature validation (B), by the reeiver. Signature
generation onsists in applying a signature algorithm on the signed doument. This algo-
rithm results in a data le alled Cryptohash, or more frequently Digital Signature. This
signature is passed over from the emitter to the reeiver along with the signed doument.
The reeiver an then hek whether the digital signature mathes the doument.
The gure 4 and 5 show respetively the proess of digital signature generation and the
proess of digital signature validation.
Figure 4: Digital Signature Generation Figure 5: Digital Signature Validation
The proess of digital signature generation takes as input the doument to be signed
and the private key of the signer. It produes as output a digital signature, or Cryptohash,
whih aompanies the signed doument so as to prove its integrity. The rst step of digital
signature generation is to apply a hash funtion to the doument, so as to obtain a xed
length data le that uniquely mathes the original doument (A.1). The resulting hash value
is enrypted with the private key of the signer, so as to guarantee that nobody else ould
have produed this signature, and thus to prove that no maliious entity have provided or
modied the doument (A.2). The doument an then be publily published along with its
digital signature (A.3).
When a user wants to exploit a doument that is publily available, or that has been
transfered over an inseure ommuniation hannel suh as the Internet, it an then verify
that this doument has been issued by the pretended issuer, and has not been tampered
with during transfer. The proess of digital signature validation takes as input the published
doument, the digital signature and the publi key of the pretended signer (B.0, B.2). The
validation is made of two parallel proesses. On the rst hand, the doument is hashed with
the same hash funtion that has been used for the signature generation (B.1). This step
provides the hash value of the available doument. On the other hand, the digital signature
INRIA
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(=the Cryptohash) is derypted with the publi key of the signer (B.2). The hash value of
the original doument is retrieved by this way. This step guarantees that no other person
tries to impersonate the real signer. One the hash of the original doument and the hash
of the available doument are available, it is suient to ompare them. If they math, the
available doument is the one that has been signed. Otherwise, it means that the available
doument is not the one that has been signed.
The unvalidity of the proess of digital signature validation an have several auses.
The more obvious one is of ourse the modiation of the doument, or the substitution
by another one. But the modiation of the digital signature itself has the same result.
If someone has a valid doument without the original digital signature, it an not hek
the validity of the doument. Another ause of validation error is the lak of knowledge
about the signer. When the reeiver does not have a opy of the publi key of the signer
that he knows to be valid, it annot validate the signature. Atually, anybody an sign the
doument and provide a valid signature for it. If you do not trust the signer, the digital
signature an not provide the proof of integrity of a doument.
2.1.2 Cryptographi Message Syntax
Another onstraint exists in the veriation of a doument. The reeiver of the doument
must have all neessary data for exeuting this validation, that is to say the doument, the
digital signature and the publi key ertiate of the signer. However, it an be neessary to
trust doument issuers that are not known beforehand, that is to say for whih the publi
key ertiate is not previously stored by the reeiver. Therefore, this publi key ertiate
must be provided along with the signed doument. Proess of trusting previously unknown
signers implies signature delegation, whih is presented in subsetion 2.2.
This data availability onstraint means that several les must be transfered along with
the signed doument for veriation. It is therefore neessary to bind them together, so
as to prevent omplex and slow doument exhange protools between the signer and the
reeiver. A solution for providing the doument, the digital signature and the publi key
ertiate of the signer is to integrate them in a CMS (Cryptographi Message Syntax)
doument [Hou02℄
3
, and to publish not diretly the signed doument, but its assoiated
CMS le. This CMS le an ontain or not the signed doument, depending on the ontext
of publiation.
Figure 6 shows an example of a Cryptographi Message Syntax (CMS) ompliant File in
a human-readable XML format.
For enapsulating Digital Signatures, the CMS type `signed-data' is used. It ontains
data neessary for validating the Digital Signature. Enapsulated data in this kind of CMS
le is organized into two ategories: Signers data, and Certiates data. Signers data
ontains the ID of one or several signer(s) of the doument, as well as the Digital Signature
of the doument for eah signer. Certiates data omprises X.509 Publi Key Certiates
3
CMS is a follow up to PKCS7 message format, dened by RSA Laboratories [RSA95℄
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Figure 6: The ontent of a Cryptographi Message Standard (CMS) ompliant File.
for the signers, and potentially a Certiate Revoation List. Moreover, the signed-data le
an also ontain the signed doument itself.
CMS Files use the ASN.1 syntax and are enoded in DER (Distinguished Enoding
Rules) format [Bur93℄. This makes it possible to integrate binary ontent suh as Digital
Signatures together with the name of the signer and the properties of the ertiates.
2.1.3 Asymmetri Enryption and Hashing Algorithms
The proess of digital signature generation and validation makes use of two dierent kinds
of algorithms: one hash funtion, and one enryption algorithm. Numerous ryptographi
algorithms are available that provide one or the other funtionality. Although urrent re-
ommendations for digital signature strongly restrit the hoie between the RSA/MD5 pair
and the DSA/SHA-1 pair, the hoie of algorithm remains open. Atually, the required
seurity level, the memory and performane onstraints of the system that makes use of
digital signature an strongly impat the hoie.
Commonly used Hash algorithms are MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5) [Riv92℄, SHA-
1 (Seure Hash Algorithm) [Nat93℄, as well as SHA-224, SHA1-256, Tiger [AB96℄ and
Whirlpool [Int04℄
4
. Table 1 shows the harateristis of these algorithms. The output
length is the length of the resulting hash value. When several variants exist for a given algo-
rithm, several output lengths are given. The seurity level indiates whether the algorithm
is onsidered as seure. The availability indiates when a given algorithm is available in
4
Only SHA-1 or better algoritms should be used for signing douments, sine it is possible to build false
Certiates using MD5 in a ouple of hours [WY05℄. Theoretial attaks also exist on the SHA-1 hash
funtion, but are urrently not exploitable in pratie.
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tools for signing arhives (XXX), regularly onsidered in speiations (XX) or available in
APIs but not integrated in existing tools (X).
Hash Algorithm Output length Seurity Availability
(bytes) Level
MD5 128 Broken XX
SHA-1 160 Theoretially XXX
Broken
SHA-224 224 High X
SHA256 256 High X
Tiger 128/160/192 High X
Whirlpool 512 High X
Table 1: Main Hash algorithms
Commonly used enryption algorithms are RSA [RSA93℄, DSA (Digital Signature Al-
gorithm) [Nat94℄, and ECC (Ellipti Curve Cryptography) [BWBL02℄. Table 2 shows the
harateristis of these algorithms. The typial key sizes gives the key sizes ommonly used
for ensuring seure ommuniations. For eah key, dierent lengths an be used depending
on the neessary seurity level. Several values are then given. The seurity level indiates
whether the algorithm an be onsidered as seure. The availability indiates when a given
algorithm is available in tools for signing arhives (XXX), regularly onsidered in speia-
tions (XX) or available in APIs but not integrated in existing tools (X). When available,
the typial assoiated hash algorithm gives the hash funtion that is ommonly used with
the enryption algorithm.
Enryption Algorithm Typial Seurity Availability Typial assoiated
Key Sizes Level Hash algorithm
RSA 1024/2048 High XX MD5
DSA 1024/2048 High XXX SHA-1
ECC 160/192 High X
Table 2: Main Enryption algorithms
The hoie of pairing a hash funtion with an enryption algorithm is quite open, al-
though one restrition exists: the length of the data generated through the hash funtion
must be at least as long as the enryption key. For instane, SHA-1 generates a digest of 160
bytes (=1280 bits). The longest key an then be 1024 bits. For a more powerful signature,
it is neessary to use a hash funtion with longer output, for instane SHA-256 (256 bytes
= 2048 bits). A key of 2048 bits an then be used.
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For non strategi systems, the urrent trend is to use the DSA/SHA-1 algorithm pair.
It is onsidered as suiently seure, and has the non-negligible advantage of ompatibility
with existing signature tools.
The digital signature of a doument enables to guarantee its integrity, that is to say
that a given doument is idential to the original one. In partiular, this aims at preventing
doument modiation or substitution. However, the guarantee of integrity requires that
the reeiver trusts the signer of the doument. Consequently, it is neessary to authentiate
the signer. Otherwise, anybody an publish a le and provide a valid signature. Two ases
of authentiation exist: either the signer is already known to the reeiver, or it is not, and
a trusted third party is then required to guarantee the identity of all potential signers.
Following setion will detail the authentiation proess.
2.2 Authentiation
Authentiation is the formal identiation of the emitter of a message. It onsists in the
veriation of the validity of the identity of this emitter.
In the ontext of Digital Signature, the emitter of the message is in fat the signer of the
doument. Its identity is arried along with the signed doument as a publi key ertiate
ompliant with the X.509 format. These data are enapsulated together in a CMS le. The
authentiation proess implies to ompare this ertiate bound to the doument and the
ertiates that are onsidered as trusted by the entity that performs the authentiation.
These trusted ertiates are stored in a database alled Certiate Store.
2.2.1 Certiate Validation
Two senarios of authentiation of a publi key ertiate exist. Either the Subjet, that is
to say the signer of the publi key, is known to the entity that performs the authentiation,
or it is not. In the seond ase, the authentiation an be performed if the Issuer of the
publi key ertiate (or one issuer of the issuer's ertiate) is known.
The requirement for both authentiation senarios is that the set of ertiates that
are onsidered as trusted are transfered in a seure way to the entity that performs the
authentiation before the authentiation ours. The gure 7 shows this proess.
The distribution of trusted ertiates is done in an initialization phase. A trusted
Certiation Authority delivers the set of ertiates that the authentiating part an trust
over a seure hannel (or possibly oine). These ertiates are stored by the authentiating
part in its Certiate Store, and marked as trusted. This means that when the lient latter
handles a ertiate that is available in the Certiate Store and is marked as trusted, it
will be able to assert that this ertiate is a valid one. In other ases, it will not be able to
verify whether a given ertiate whih Subjet is for instane SFRENOT is a valid one, or
a fake one built by someone who pretends to be SFRENOT but who is not.
The rst mehanism (Case 1) is shown on gure 8.
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Figure 7: The Certiation Distribution required for Certiate Cheking
Figure 8: Certiate Validation (Case 1): the Certiate is known to the heker
In the Case 1, the authentiating part rst need to retrieve the publi key ertiate.
In partiular, in the ase of Digital Signature transmitted through a CMS le, it extrats
the ertiate from it (1). Then it an hek whether this ertiate is already known
and marked as trusted (2). In our example, the signer is alled PIERREP. The Subjet
of the ertiate is then PIERREP. It is possible to assert its validity beause the same
ertiate for PIERREP (with same Issuer and ertiate signature) is marked as trusted
in the Certiate Store.
The seond mehanism (Case 2) is shown on gure 9.
Figure 9: Certiate Validation (Case 2): the Certiate is unknown to the heker
The seond mehanism is made possible by the struture of publi key ertiates. They
are either issued by a third party, or self signed. In any ase, they ontain two identities
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that are relevant for authentiation. The rst one is the identity of the Subjet, that is to
say the owner of the ertiate. The seond one is the identity of the Issuer, that is to say
the entity that has emitted the ertiate.
The authentiating part rst need to retrieve the various publi key ertiates that are
required to perform the authentiation (1). Then it builds the ertiate path, by linking
the ertiate of eah Subjet with the one of its Issuer (2). The validity of the ertiate
path is asserted if the root ertiate that is to say the rst of the ertiate hierarhy
exists in the Certiate Store and is marked as trusted (3). The ertiate path is only
valid if all ertiates used for signing other ones have the right to do it, whih is indiated
in the ertiate itself. In our seond example, the signer PIERREP is unknown to the
authentiating part. It is provided with the ertiate for ARES, who has been used to
issue it, and the ertiate for INRIA, that has been used to sign the ARES one. The
validity of this ertiate hain is asserted beause both INRIA and ARES have the right
to issue ertiates, and beause the authentiating part knows the ertiate of INRIA.
2.2.2 X.509 Certiate
The X.509 publi key Certiate is a data struture that enapsulates a publi key and
assoiated data neessary for identifying a given subjet [HFPS99℄. It an be published in
a CMS le, or as stand-alone data.
The X.509 Certiate is digitally signed by the issuer of the publi/private key pair,
whih thereby laims that the subjet of the ertiate is the owner of the assoiated private
key. It also laims that he aknowledges that the subjet's name (alled Distinguished Name)
is orret. Every user whih trusts the issuer of the ertiate will then be able to assert
the identity of the emitter of a message that an be derypted (or whose digital signature
an be veried) with the publi key ontained in this ertiate. This is the authentiation.
This proess implies of ourse that the private key has not been orrupted.
Figure 10 shows the ontent of a X.509 ertiate.
Fields of the ertiate are the publi key, the name of the Subjet, the name of the
Issuer of the Certiate, the validity period, the URL of the revoation server, and the
Digital Signature. A additional eld allows to hek the validity of the ertiates, and is
not represented in this human-readable representation: the digital signature of the ertiate
by its issuer.
The name of subjets are dened by Distinguished Names (DN), whih originate in
LDAP speiations [WK97℄. Distinguished Names are a omposition of following elds:
CN=`Common Name', OU=`Organization Unit', O=`Organization', L=`Loation'(ity), S=
`State', C=`Country ode'. Denition of Distinguished Names states that the elds follow a
hierarhial organization, and thus that their order imports. For instane, a DN {C=Frane,
O=INRIA} is dierent of a DN {O=INRIA, C=Frane}. However, in several tools for
manipulating ertiates, suh as Sun Keytool, the order of the elds is xed, preventing
suh ambiguities.
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Figure 10: Content of a X.509 Certiate
2.2.3 Certiate Store
A Certiate Store is a database that ontains Publi Key Certiates that the owner of the
Store knows. Certiates an be identied as trusted and untrusted. It usually also inludes
one or several private keys. It is then alled a Keystore
5
.
The Certiate Store is proteted by a password. When private keys exists, eah one
is proteted by its own password. Consequently, a Certiate Store (or a Keystore) an be
shared among several subjets, if the ertiate management is shared.
Figure 11 shows the ontent of a Certiate Store: trusted ertiates, untrusted erti-
ates, private keys.
The onjunt use of a digital signature and a ertiate store allows to guarantee both
the integrity of a doument and to authentiate its signer. Both properties must apply
together. However, this mehanism, if it guarantees that a doument has not been modied
5
http://java.sun.om/j2se/1.5.0/dos/tooldos/solaris/keytool.html
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Figure 11: Content of a Certiate Store
after its publiation, does not protet its ontent from maliious eavesdroppers. The third
seurity property, ondentiality, an be used to ahieve suh a protetion.
2.3 Condentiality
2.3.1 Denition
Condentiality is the absene of unauthorized dislosure of information [AJB00℄. In the
ontext of omponent deployment, this means that the ontent of the omponent - ode or
other resoures - is not available to users that are not expliitly authorized to manipulate
them.
2.3.2 How to ahieve Condentiality ?
Condentiality with asymmetri ryptography is ahieved by enrypting the doument with
the Publi Key of the reeiver (1). Thus, the owner of the mathing private key is the only
one that an derypt the doument (2), and gain aess to its ontent.
Figure 12 shows the proess of enryption and deryption of a doument for ensuring
ondentiality.
Beause the doument is not enrypted with the private key of the emitter, this proess
does not provide means of performing authentiation. In pratie, enryption for onden-
tiality is used together with enryption for authentiation. Therefore, the reeiver of the
doument, after having derypted it with its own private key, an make the deryption with
the publi key of the emitter and thus ontrol its identity.
2.4 Conlusions
Seurity requirements for omputer systems are integrity, authentiation and ondentiality.
The rst property aims at verifying that the ontent of data have not been tampered with.
The seond property aims at identifying the emitter of the data. Both steps an not be
onsidered independently: if the emitter of a message is not authentiated, any maliious
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Figure 12: Enryption of a doument for ondentiality
user an publish data with orret integrity validation mehanism. Similarly, if a message
is authentiated but its integrity is not guaranteed, there is no way not know whether any
single byte of it has really been emitted by the authentiated emitter.
The third property is ondentiality. It aims at proteting data from undue read aess.
In this report, we will not onsider it further sine we onsider that aess to omponent
resoures does not make it possible for a maliious user to gain aess to the omponent
platform.
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3 Seure Deployment
The important inrease of quantity and diversity in omponent systems makes it neessary
to protet them against maliious persons and systems. Components an be modied during
deployment, or simply be published by untrusted issuers. It is therefore neessary to guar-
antee the integrity of the omponents and the authentiation of their issuer. Condentiality
will not be onsidered further.
Seurity mehanisms must not imply modiations in the deployment proess. Users
(and platforms) must ontinue to use their omponent platforms and to update it without
modiation. Consequently, the signed omponents must be delivered as a single arhive
whih inludes both the original resoures and the data neessary for verifying integrity
and authentiation. Otherwise, the seurity mehanisms are not transparent, they will be
rejeted by the users, and will not help improve the seurity of the systems.
In the ase of OSGi
tm
platforms, the solution onsists in inluding the digital signature
in the omponent (also named bundle) itself. Consequently, it is not possible to sign the
whole omponent. A list of resoures present in the omponent and of their respetive hash
value is built. This list is the one that is signed, and inluded in the meta-data of the
omponent along with the signature.
This setion rst presents an overview of the entities that intervene in the seure de-
ployment of bundles, of the requirements and of the proess for signing and verifying signed
omponents. Next, it details the struture of a signed bundle as dened for OSGi
tm
bundles.
Lastly, the proess of signature generation and signature validation will be presented.
3.1 Overview
This subsetion provides an overview of the entities and data that intervene in seure de-
ployment of bundles in an OSGi
tm
platform. It shows how the digital signature an be
exploited in the ontext of bundle deployment, so as to guarantee the integrity of a bundle
and the authentiation of its signer.
First, the priniples of bundle deployment are presented. Then, the requirements for
supporting a digital signature based seurity mehanism are presented, as well as the overall
proess of bundle signing and validating.
3.1.1 Bundle Deployment
The deployment of a bundle is the part of its life yle that spans between the end of its
development and the moment it is ready to provide servies on an OSGi
tm
platform. It on-
tains several steps: publiation of the bundle, disovery, dependeny resolution, download,
installation, onguration. Update phase must also be taken into aount [HHW99℄.
Two main types of deployment an be identied. The rst kind is platform-initiated
deployment, whih an be seen as 'pull deployment', where the signal that triggers the
deployment originates from the omponent platform itself. The seond kind of deployment
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ours when it is initiated through a remote signal. This ours for instane in the ase of
onsole-based remote management of a omponent platform [RF06℄.
The entities that intervene in the deployment proess are the following:
The Bundle Issuer, it is the person or system that makes the bundle available for the
end users. It an be a software developer or a software vendor.
The Bundle Repository, it is the server that publishes the bundles, that is to say that
provide a remotely aessible servie so that the end users an nd and download the
bundles.
The Exeution platform, it is the omponent platform that exeutes the bundles. It
must support bundle deployment, and often initiates it. In this report, it is also
simply alled the lient.
The deployment proess is initiated by a deployment trigger. This trigger is either a
loal shell (pull deployment) or a remote onsole (push deployment).
Seuring the deployment proess implies that the exeution platform only deploys and
installs bundles that ome from trusted issuers. As far as bundles are signed, they an safely
be published on inseure repositories. The deployment trigger, on its side, need to have a
seure ommuniation hannel to the platform, so as to prevent deployment of bundles
by untrusted parties. Moreover, it must be proteted from undue use. The protetion of
deployment trigger relates to system management more than to deployment, so it will not be
studied further here. We assume that only valid users have aess to the exeution platform.
3.1.2 Requirements for Authentiation
Subsetion 2.2 has shown that the ondition for exploiting digital signature as a mean of
proving both integrity of a doument and authentiation of its signer is that the entity
that heks the signature (we will all it the lient) knows either the publi key of the
signer itself, or the publi key of the ertiate issuer that has provided the signer's key.
Through signature delegation, a omplete hierarhy of ertiate issuers an exist between
the ertiate issuer the lient knows and the signer itself.
In any ase, the signer must have a private key that the lient an trust, and the lient
must have a publi key that he knows to be trustworthy. Typially, both keys are provided
by a ommon ertiation authority through a seure ommuniation hannel.
Figure 13 shows the requirements for the authentiation proess: the publi key of the
authentiated part must be known to the entity whih wishes to perform the authentiation.
One the requirement of key availability is fullled, the seure deployment an our.
Next setion will present the internal struture of a signed bundle, and the way the
digital signature is used to sign not only one doument, but also all available resoures of
the bundle.
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Figure 13: The requirements for the authentiation proess.
3.2 Struture of a Signed Bundle
Beause of the partiular onstraints on the signature of a bundle, it is neessary to store
it and all related resoures in the bundle itself. Moreover, it is mandatory that multiple
signers an sign the same bundle.
The struture of a signed bundle is shown on Figure 14.
Figure 14: Example of a signed HelloWorld bundle, signed by PIERREP.
INRIA
Seure Component Deployment 25
Signature File and Digital Signature
 The Signature File of a signed bundle is a meta-data le that
the ontain the Signature of the Manifest le, that is to say
its hash alue. It guarantees the integrity of the Manifest le.
 The Digital Signature of a le is a byte array that ontains the
signature of a given le by a given person, that is to say the en-
ryption of the hash value of the signed le. In a signed bundle,
the Digital Signature of the so-alled Signature File is stored
in the Signature Blok File. It guarantees the integrity of
the Signature File and the identity of the signer
A rst solution for arhive signing (bundles are spei jar arhives) is given by the Jar
Arhive speiations [Sun03℄. However, this gives the possibility to sign only a subset of an
arhive. This implies that modiations are possible on the arhive even after its signature,
whih is a potential seurity leak. Therefore, OSGi
tm
speiations restrit the signature
by imposing that all resoures in an arhive are signed by the signer(s). In the ontrary
ase, the signature is not valid. Embedded arhives must be signed on the same way. OSGi
Signature Files only need to ontain the hash value of the Manifest, hash value of the other
resoures are not required [All05℄.
The Manifest le of the arhive (1) ontains the hash value of eah resoure in the
arhive. To support several signers, the digital signature is applied not diretly on the
Manifest le, but on a so-alled `Signature File' (2), whih is spei to eah signer. A
hash value of the Manifest le must be inluded. The digital signature of this Signature
File is stored along with data that are neessary for its validation in a CMS le of type
`signed-data' whih is named `Signature Blok File' (3).
This struture of a signed bundle will be enlightened by a simple example of the Hel-
loWorld bundle, whose signer is named PIERREP. This bundle ontains three lasses: Hel-
loWorldAtivator (the ativator, or starter, of the bundle), HelloWorldInterfae (the deni-
tion of the HelloWorldInterfae servie that is provided by the bundle), and HelloWorldImpl
(the implementation of the above mentioned servie).
The meta-data of the bundle are the following. First, the Manifest le, MANI-
FEST.MF, whih ontains meta-data spei to OSGi bundles, as well as the hash value
of all resoures. Seondly, the Signature File, PIERRE.SF, ontains the hash value of
the Manifest le. Thirdly, the Signature Blok File, PIERRE.DSA, is a CMS le
that ontains the digital signature of the Signature File, and the publi key ertiate of
the signer. They must be stored in this order (and before all other resoures) in the bundle
arhive.
A overview of the three meta-data les is shown is table 3. Spei harateristis of
eah if the meta-data les used for bundle signature are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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File denomination Example Content
Manifest File MANIFEST.MF Hash value for eah resoure in arhive
Signature File PIERREP.SF Hash value of the Manifest File
Signature Blok File PIERREP.RSA Digital Signature of Signature File
Table 3: Meta-data involved in Bundle Signature
3.2.1 The Manifest File
The Manifest le for the HelloWorld example bundle is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: The Manifest File for the HelloWorld Example Bundle.
The Manifest le of an OSGi
tm
bundle ontains the meta-data required for bundle de-
ployment: the name of the bundle, its version, the pakages it provides, the pakages it
depends on, its ativator lass for starting it. In a signed bundle, this meta-data is enrihed
by the hash value of eah resoure the bundle ontains. A resoure is identied by its full
path inside the bundle. It is ompleted by a property that indiates its hash value. The
property name depends on the hash funtion that is used. In our example, this hash fun-
tion is SHA-1, and the mathing property is `SHA1-Digest'. Note that a manifest le that
ontains resoure entries that do not exist in the arhive or that does not list all resoures
in the arhive has probably suered addition or removal of resoures and is not valid.
Storing the hash values of the resoures of the arhive guarantees that none of this
resoures have been tampered with after the moment the bundle has been signed. Moreover,
it guarantees that no resoure have been added or removed.
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3.2.2 The Signature File
The Signature le for the HelloWorld example bundle is shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16: The Signature File for the HelloWorld Example Bundle.
Eah signer of a bundle reates its own signature inluding both Signature File and
Signature Blok File. The name of those le is the apitalized name of the signer. The
Signature File is identied by a `.SF' extension. For instane, in our example, the Signature
File is named `PIERREP.SF'.
The Signature File of signed OSGi
tm
is simpler that the one of signed Jar arhives. As
far as it is not possible to sign a subset of the resoure, no opy of the list of the name and
hash value of the resoures is required. Only the signature version and the hash value of
the manifest is neessary. Hash funtion is usually the same that is used in the manifest for
identifying resoures. In our HelloWorld example, the hash value of the manifest is stored
under the property name `SHA-1-Digest-Manifest'.
Storing the hash value of the manifest le enables to guarantee that it has not been
tampered with after the moment the bundle has been signed.
3.2.3 The Signature Blok File
The Signature Blok File of a signed bundle ontains the digital signature of the Signature
File and all data that are neessary to hek the validity of the signature. Its name is made
of the apitalized name of the signer. The le extension is the named of the enryption algo-
rithm used for the digital signature. It is therefore either `RSA' or `DSA'. In our HelloWorld
example, the name is PIERREP.DSA.
The Signature Blok File is a CMS ompliant le (see subsetion 2.1). It ontains the
publi key ertiate of the signer, and a SignerInfo data struture with the identier of the
signer and the digital signature itself. It an also ontain a Certiate Revoation List.
The Signature Blok ontains a valid signature if the digital signature is a valid one for
the Signature File, and has been reated using the private key of the signer. Of ourse,
the validation proess must hek whether the publi key ertiate an be trusted (see
subsetion 2.2). It guarantees that the Signature File has not been modied sine the
signature ourred, and that the signer is a trustworthy one.
The reader an refer in the Figure 6 for an example of a Signature Blok File.
One the struture of a signed bundle and of its meta-data les have been presented, the
algorithms used for signing the bundle, and for validating this signature, will be detailed.
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3.3 The Proess of Signature and Validation
The proess of signing bundle must reate bundle meta-data that are ompliant with pre-
sented speiations. Not only the meta-data ontent must be valid, but several other
onstraints must also be onsidered: the order of resoures in the arhive and the exhaus-
tiveness of identied resoures.
Of ourse, the proess of validation of the bundle signature must hek the same on-
straints.
3.3.1 Signature
The main steps of bundle signature generation are the following. First, the publi/private
key pair must be available before signing. This is the initialization phase. Next, the manifest
le, MANIFEST.MF, is generated. It ontains the name of every resoure in the bundle
along with their hash value. Then, the Signature le is generated. It ontains the hash
value of the manifest le. The Signature Blok File is generated, and ontains the digital
signature of the Signature File, and the publi key ertiate of the signer. Lastly, the whole
arhive is generated, the meta-data are sorted rst, and then the other resoures.
Figure 17 shows the algorithm for signing a bundle. You an refer to gure 25 from
Annexe 6.3 for further details.
Figure 17: The Algorithm for signing a Bundle.
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3.3.2 Validation
The proess of bundle signature validation is symmetri to the signature generation one.
First, the entity that heks the signature needs to authentiate the signer, that is to say to
hek whether it knows its publi key ertiate or it is apable of establishing a Certiate
Path between this publi key ertiate and a ertiate he knows (see subsetion 2.2). If
the signer an not be authentiated, it is not worth trying to verify the signature, beause
anybody an build a valid signature.
The seond step of the validation of bundle signature is the veriation of the orret
order of the resoures in the arhive. As already mentioned, the rst les must be in this
order the Manifest le, the Signature File and the Signature Blok File. All other resoures
ome afterwards.
The third step is the validation of the oherene of the meta-data les. The Signature
Blok File must ontain a valid digital signature of the Signature File by the signer. The
Signature File must ontain the orret hash value for the manifest le. The Manifest le
must ontain the hash value for all resoures of the arhive, without exeption, and without
omission.
When these three steps are heked and valid, the signature of the bundle is valid. Should
any of the riteria not be met, the bundle signature is not valid.
Figure 18 shows the algorithm for validating a signed bundle. You an refer to gure 26
from Annexe 6.3 for further details.
Figure 18: The Algorithm for Validating a signed Bundle.
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3.4 Conlusions
Seuring the deployment of omponents implies to protet the exeution platform from
maliious omponent publishers, and from potential modiations of the omponents after
their publiation. Suh protetion is ahieved in the ase of OSGi
tm
bundles by the signature
of the bundles, whih is based on digital signature and enables to store the signature itself
and related data inside the bundle itself. The protetion of bundles is done through two
steps. First, the bundle is signed by a bundle publisher that is publily known. Seondly,
the bundle signature is validated just before being installed, so as to hek that the signature
is valid and that the bundle has not suered modiations.
Suh a proess does not prevent maliious eavesdropper to steal the ontent of the om-
ponent. This protetion level would require ondentiality, and an not be ahieved by
simple integration of meta-data in the omponent. It requires enryption of the omponent,
whih makes neessary to have a dediated key management faility. Moreover, it would
break the ompatibility of published omponents with unseured platforms.
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4 Implementation: SFelix
SFelix
6
is the implementation of the bundle signature validation proess of the OSGi
tm
speiation, whih is a part of OSGi
tm
Seurity Layer. It is provided together with the
SFelix JarSigner tool, whih enables to sign bundles and to publish them on a FTP server. It
also provides the possibility to update the repository meta-data le for the OSGi
tm
Bundle
Repository version 2 (OBR 2). SFelix is based on the Felix
7
implementation of the OSGi
tm
platform. Felix is a projet from the Apahe Inubator, and is a follow-up of Osar OSGi
tm
platform
8
.
To the extent of our knowledge, no other implementation of bundle signing and validation
faility exists for the OSGi
tm
platform. SFelix is then the rst projet to provide it, at least
in the Felix Projet. Moreover, no Java implementation of a jar arhive signer seems to
be available as open soure projet. A tutorial exist on the OnJava web site, but uses Sun
libraries that have been removed from the Java Virtual Mahine distribution
9
.
It has thus been neessary to implement the whole bundle signature and validation
proess in SFelix. An implementation of the algorithms for signature and validation have
been developed (see subsetion 3.3).
4.1 Overview
We rst present an overview of the priniples of the SFelix seure omponent deployment
appliation. It is made up of the platform and of the JarSigner tool. The preise role of the
appliation is detailed, then the struture of the program and its publi API are explained.
4.1.1 Role of SFelix platform and SFelix JarSigner
SFelix JarSigner and SFelix over the whole deployment proess of omponents.
SFelix JarSigner overs the issuer side of the bundle deployment proess. It allows a
bundle issuer to sign the bundle, and to publish them on a publi repository. Currently,
only the FTP protool is supported for le transfer, but an extension towards other protools
suh as SSH or FTP/TLS is foreseen. Moreover, SFelix supports the update of the meta-
data of the bundle repository. These meta-data are a spei le that ontains a desription
of bundles that are available on a given (or even several) bundle repositories. They are used
by lient to disover whih bundles are available for download and installation, and to install
them together with other bundles that are required for dependeny resolution.
SFelix overs the lient-side part of the deployment proess. It validates all existing bun-
dles at the platform launh time. Only valid bundles are installed, other one are ignored. In
the ase of the installation of new bundles, these latter are heked before their installation.
This is done independently of the loation of the bundle, being stored loally or retrieved
6
http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/
7
http://inubator.apahe.org/felix/
8
http://osar.objetweb.org/
9
http://www.onjava.om/pub/a/onjava/2001/04/12/signing_jar.html
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from a bundle repository. Valid bundles are installed, unvalid ones rejeted. During bundle
update, the same veriation ours.
SFelix bundle validation ours independently of the type of deployment trigger. It
supports push deployment (initiated from the platform) as well as pull deployment (initiated
from a remote shell or onsole).
4.1.2 Struture of the Program
The general arhiteture of SFelix is the following. The seurity layer (whih inludes the
bundle validation faility) is provided as a library used by the OSGi
tm
platform. This one
has been slightly modied so as to hek the validity of the signature of a bundle before
installing it. The SFelix signer tool is provided as OSGi
tm
bundles.
Figure 19 shows the general arhiteture of the Seure Felix (SFelix) platform.
Figure 19: The general Arhiteture of the Seure Felix (SFelix) Platform.
4.1.3 The API
The API of SFelix is really simple. It is made of a method for signing bundles, and another
one for validating their signature.
The signature API is provided by the lass fr.inria.ares.jarsigner.JarSigner. The method
is named sign(), and takes as parameter the Jar le that is to be signed, the name of the
le where the signed bundle is to be stored, as well as the name of the signer, the password
to aess the Keystore, and the password that protets the private key of the signer.
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The signature validation API is provided by the lass fr.inria.ares.jarvalidation.JarValidation.
The single method is named hek(), and takes as parameters the bundle to be veried (as
a File objet) and the password of the Keystore.
Figure 20 shows the publi Appliation Programming Interfae (API) of the SFelix plat-
form.
Figure 20: The publi API of the Seure Felix (SFelix) Platform.
Next subsetion will present with more detail the SFelix bundle signature validation
faility, as well as modiation that have been done to Felix to integrate this additional step
on the deployment proess.
4.2 Felix Modiations for Bundle Validation
So as to support bundle validation, the algorithm presented in subsetion 3.3 must be im-
plemented, and exeuted for eah bundle that is installed (or updated) on the platform.
Moreover, the Felix platform must be slightly modied so as to integrated the stage of
bundle validation in the installation proess. These modiations build the bridge between
the Felix and SFelix platforms. Modiations to the ode will be presented, as well as the
exeution proess at launh time and at runtime.
4.2.1 The Code
The validation API, JarValidation, is provided as a separated library that is loaded at the
launh time of the OSGi
tm
platform. This library is alled immediately before the eetive
installation of eah bundle. When the bundle is valid, installation is proessed normally. In
the ontrary ase, the installation aborts and the bundle is removed from the list of available
bundles. All following bundles are heked and installed aording to the same proess.
The integration of the bundle validation proess only requires the modiation of three
lasses, BundleArhive, BundleCahe and Felix, and the addition of the DefaultSeure-
BundleArhive lass. All remaining ode is provided in a separate library, jarvalidation.jar,
whih is required by the SFelix platform at launh time.
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4.2.2 Launh Time of the SFelix Platform
The SFelix platform aims at preventing maliious bundles to be installed and exeuted. It
needs to ahieve its goal while limiting as muh as possible the interation with its user
(or manager). The seurity mehanisms must be as transparent as possible, so as to avoid
deterring the users from exploiting them. For guaranteeing that the installed bundles are
valid, it is neessary to be able to assert that the platform itself has not been tampered
with. The validation proess therefore ours in two steps. First, the platform ode must
be veried. Seondly, the platform, that is known to be valid, heks eah installed bundles.
The validation of the platform ode itself an be done manually through arhive signing
in a way similar to the bundle validation. However, in our ase, the integrity of the platform
ode is simply veried through its hash value. The launh sript ontaining original hash
values is publily available online on the projet web site. Its exeution guarantees the
validity of the ode arhive.
The platform an then safely hek the validity of the signature of external bundles. At
launh time, all bundles are validated before their installation. If one bundle is not valid, it
is simply rejeted, and the installation of the other bundles goes on. For eah bundle that
is orretly installed, a onrmation of installation is printed in the shell to the user.
The only interation between the platform and the user ours through the (S)Felix shell
during the validation of the rst bundle. The user is asked for the password of the Keystore,
whih is neessary to retrieve the list of ertiate that are onsidered trustful. Afterwards,
the password is stored in the ore of the platform, and reused for eah validation of a bundle.
Sine the omponents only have aess to the platform through the bundle ontext, and not
diretly, this way of storing the password is sound.
The following ode (Figure 21) show the output when launhing a new OSGi
tm
prole
with SFelix. Note the password request and the notiation of bundle validation.
4.2.3 Runtime of the SFelix Platform
When bundles are installed during the runtime of the platform, or when bundles are updated,
the same veriation proess ours. Valid bundles are installed, and invalid one rejeted.
This is of ourse true independently of the loation of installed bundles, whish an be loal
or stored in a remote repository.
Figure 22 shows a sreen-shot of the Felix shell when trying to install an unsigned bundle.
The SFelix platform enables to validate all bundles that are exeuted before their in-
stallation. The orretness of the validation proess is guaranteed by the veriation of
the platform ode before launhing the platform. In our urrent implementation, this is
simply ahieved through hash-value based veriation of the ode. More omplete solutions
are neessary to ahieve high level seurity, but depends on the exeution ontext of the
platform.
The existene of a seure OSGi
tm
platform that validates bundles before installing them
makes it neessary to have a tool available that support the proess of signing them. We
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Figure 21: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when launhing a new SFelix Prole
-
Figure 22: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when trying to install an unsigned bundle
RT n° 0323
36 Parrend & Frénot
therefore developed SFelix JarSigner. So as to support the whole deployment proess, an
additional faility is inluded that enables to publish signed bundles in a remote le reposi-
tory.
4.3 Tool: SFelix JarSigner
The SFelix JarSigner tool aims at supporting the publiation part of the proess of om-
ponent deployment. The publiation is made of the signing of the bundles, and of their
transfer to a publi bundle repository. The funtions of SFelix JarSigner are rst presented,
and the various bundles that ompose it are detailed.
4.3.1 Funtions of JarSigner
JarSigner Graphial User Interfae is omposed of three main parts. The rst aims at the
onnetion to the Keystore. The seond deals with bundle signing. The third is dediated
to the publiation of bundles onto a remote repository.
 The Keystore aess takes as input the name (Alias) of the person that wants to
sign bundles. It also takes the general password of the Keystore, that enables to aess
the list of trusted ertiates, and the password that protets the private key of the
signer. The 'Open Session' button makes it possible to hek the partiular algorithm
that is bound to the urrent alias.
 The le signing part enables to speify the name of the bundle that is to be signed, as
well as the name of the future signed bundle. Note that these names must be dierent.
Several ations over the bundle an be realized. It an of ourse be signed, but it an
also simply be heked. When signing or heking a bundle through the 'Treat Bundle'
button, the output of the proess (suess/failure) is printed in a spei information
eld at the bottom of the window. Moreover, bundles that are signed orretly or
whih signature is validated are added to the 'Seleted Bundle' list, that makes it
possible to hose whih bundle is to be published.
 The publiation faility of SFelix ontains the above mentioned 'Seleted Bundle'
list, a list of le servers, and a 'Load File(s)' button that triggers the publiation. Avail-
able bundles are exlusively the signed ones, but le servers an be added, modied
and removed by the user of SFelix JarSigner.
Figure 23 shows the Graphial User Interfae of the SFelix JarSigner tool. The dierent
parts of the tool that have been presented in this setion an be observed.
The modular organization of SFelix JarSigner will then be presented.
4.3.2 Bundles of JarSigner
SFelix JarSigner is an OSGi
tm
appliation. It is a tool that makes it possible to seure
bundle deployment, and is itself made up of validated bundles: it is exeuted in the SFelix
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Figure 23: The Graphial User Interfae of the SFelix JarSigner Tool.
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platform. To exeute it in another OSGi
tm
platform would require to make the jarvalidation
library available as an arhive. This is quite easy to ahieve, but, sine it is not ompliant
with OSGi
tm
speiations, it is out of the sope of this study.
SFelix is built of three sets of ode. The rst one is the jarvalidation library. The
seond one is a lightweight plug-in support we developed for graphial interfaes named
omponentGui. The last one is of ourse the JarSigner tool itself.
The jarvalidation library provides the ryptographi library, the library for aessing to
the Keystore, as well as the bundle validation API whih is also used in JarSigner.
The omponentGui faility is provided as a set of two bundles. The rst one is named
`SFelix Utilities', and provides various libraries for graphial interfaes elements. The seond
one is named `Generi Frame', and provides a simple graphial window that ontains the list
of all Graphial User Interfaes that are available in the platform. These GUIs are tagged
by the fr.inria.ares.sfelix.utils.GuiSwingComponent programming interfae they implement.
They are made available as OSGi
tm
servies.
The JarSigner tool is omposed of two bundles, `Jar Signer', whih provides the servie
for signing bundles, and `Jar Signer GUI', whih provides the graphial interfae that allows
to aess the signature servie. This interfae have been presented in the previous subsetion.
The following ode (gure 24) shows the output when launhing SFelix JarSigner. The
onrmation of the validation of the signature is printed for eah bundle, and the various
bundles that were presented are listed.
4.4 Conlusions
In this setion, the SFelix platform and the SFelix JarSigner tool have been presented.
Used together, they support the whole proess of seure deployment for OSGi
tm
bundles:
signature, publiation, and remote installation through the OBR 2 bundle repository if the
bundles have a valid signature. SFelix is based on the Felix OSGi
tm
implementation: all
bundles that run in SFelix also run on Felix, but Felix bundles need to be signed by a known
person before being integrated in the seure SFelix platform.
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Figure 24: Sreen-shot of SFelix shell when launhing the SFelix JarSigner Tool
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5 Conlusions
Until now, only very few eort seems to have been dediated to seuring omponent plat-
forms. Due to the even broader dissemination of suh platforms, it appears to be neessary
to foster knowledge about seurity issues in omponent platforms. This work intends to
make it possible for not seurity speialists to take suh stakes into aount when build-
ing a system based on a omponent platform. It is targeted to the OSGi
tm
platform, but
presented onepts an easily be mapped towards other omponents systems.
This tehnial report gives a detailed overview of mehanisms that intervene during
omponent signature and validation, inluding the ryptographi onepts that are neessary
to understand the whole proess.
Mathing implementation of bundle signature and validation is introdued. Bundle vali-
dation is part of OSGi
tm
Release 4 Seurity Layer, and is as suh integrated in the OSGi
tm
framework. Our implementation is available in the SFelix framework,whih is an extension
of the Felix OSGi
tm
implementation. Bundle signature is provided as a stand-alone applia-
tion, SFelix JarSigner. This tool also supports publiation of bundle in publily aessible
servers.
This work has brought to light further needs for seurity in omponent platforms. In
partiular, bundle validation implies that lients hava reliable informations about the signer.
Several questions emerge: how to make sure lients have aess to all bundle they are allowed
to install ? How to restrit the aess from ertain lients to ertain signers ? How to deal
with new signers ? And how to deal with previous signers that are no longer allowed to
publish bundles ? Moreover, it an sometime be neessary to be able to revoke isolated
bundles, without preventing valid bundles to be installed.
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6 Annexes
6.1 Existing Tools for Seure Java Appliations
Existing tools that are add-ons to the Java Virtual Mahine are jar signing failities, and
lass iphering software.
Signing Jars Some failities already exist for signing jar. The main one is Sun Jarsigner
[Sun04℄, that provides a ommand line utility for signing jars. It resembles muh to OSGi
Seurity Layer, but has a dierent approah:
 it is no Java program, but a ommand line tool. This is not onsistent with OSGi
speiation, whih states that the Seurity Layer is plaed between the Java Virtual
Mahine and OSGi platform,
 one an not assume that an OSGi platform exeuting in a previsouly unknown en-
vironnement have neessary rights to exeute third party program through JNI, nor
that this third party program (here Sun Jarsigner) is available
 and last but not least, OSGi speiation brings its own ontraints on arhive signature
that are not speied by Jar speiation, and thus not enfored by Sun Jarsigner.
Moreover, no readily available library for signing jar is available. One implementation
has been proposed by Ra Krikorian in an On-Java artile. However, this implementation
use a Sun API that is no longer supported, as far as it has been proved to be inseure.
Ciphering of Classes Besides signing arhive, an other way to protet lasses is to en-
rypt them, and to derypt them only at runtime for the exeution. This tehnique enables
to guarantee not only integrity of soures and authentiation of the emitter, but also on-
dentiality against potential maliious third parties.
All suh libraries that are available are not free. Two of them, Canner and Katirya,
are urrently only available for the Mirosoft Windows environment. Canner, by Cinnabar
Systems
10
, reates an exeutable le that then exeutes on the loal JVM. Katirya
11
works
aording to the same priniple. jLok is the only tool that do not only work on MSWindows.
It pathes the Virtual Mahine so as to integrate runtime deryption of enrypted lasses
12
.
Available tools for ensuring seurity in Java appliations are still quite limited. This is
explained by the fat that most seurity problems are appliation and environnement spei.
Therefore, eort for improving seurity in java system is either entered on the Virtual
Mahine itself - whih does its job in a quite satisfatory manner - or on providing tool sets
for spei appliations. It is thus neessary to developp our own tools for implementing
OSGi Seurity Layer.
10
http://www.innabarsystems.om/anner.html
11
http://www.mygiserver.om/∼ipnetdevelop/katirya.html
12
http://www.jbitsoftware.om/JBit/do/displayPage?targetPageId=produts.jlokinfo
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6.2 Java Cryptographi Libraries
Developping our own tools for enforing Java seurity means providing a generi seurity
API for signing and verifying jars. Suh an API needs to releave on a valid implementation
of ryptographi algorithms for hash value, digital signature and enryption. Suh an im-
plementation is of ourse out of sope of our work, and several ryptographi libraries have
been developped reently.
This libraries an easily be plugged in java programs through the provider mehanism:
by indiating the abbreviation mathing an available provider at a ryptographi method
all, the aller ensures that this provider is the one that performs the ryptographi oper-
ation. This makes it possible to integrate third party providers, but also to validate them
independantly of their appliations.
A list of seurity provider is maintained by Sun
13
. The prinipal open soure ryp-
tographi library has been developped by the Legion of the Bouny Castle
14
. However,
for appliations that need more than a basi level of seurity, these ryptographi libraries
need to be validated. The referene organization for ryptographi module validation is
the Amerian National Institute of Standards and Tehnology (NIST) that has developped
the Federal Information Proessing Standards (FIPS) program for validating ryptographi
libraries [Nat℄. Several Java libraries have undergone suh a validation, some of them are
available for use as independant software parts. These libraries are RSA BSAFE Crypto-J,
IBM SSLite and CryptoLite, Certiom Seurity Builder FIPS Java Module, and Entrust
Authority Seurity Toolkit for the Java Platform.
6.3 Algorithm for Bundle Signature and Validation
Figure 25 shows the detailed sequene diagram of the algorithm for signing a bundle.
Figure 26 shows the detailed sequene diagram of the algorithm for validating a signed
bundle.
13
http://java.sun.om/ produts/je/je122_providers.html
14
http://www.bounyastle.org/
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JarSigner KeyStoreManager CryptographicLibrary
privateKey : getPrivateKey(signer, password)
SignedJarManifest
manifest : new(Jar, hashAlgorithm)
SignatureFile
signatureFile : new(manifest, signer)
JarSignerGui
 : sign(jarFile, signer, password)
SignatureBlock
block : new(signatureFile, cert, privateKey)
cert : getCertificate(signer, password)
SignedJarFile
 : buildSignedjarFile
hash : getHashValue(fileData, algo)for all file in archive
hash : getHashValue(manifest, algo)
CMSfile : getCMSFData(signatureFile, cert, privateKey)
boolean : result
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Felix JarValidation
 : check(file, password)
SignedJarFile
 : new(file)
Certificate[] : getValidCertificates(password)
boolean : checkCoherence(certificate)for each valid
certificate
KeyStoreManager
boolean : isValid(Certificate, password)for each
certificate
boolean : checkResourceOrderValid()
boolean : checkSignatureBlockValidity(signer)
CryptographicLibrary
boolean : checkCMSDataValidity(signatureFile, block)
boolean : checkSignatureFileValidity(signatureFile, manifest)
boolean : checkHashValue(manifestHash, pretendedHash, algo)
boolean : checkManifestValidity()
boolean : result
boolean : result
boolean : checkHashValue(manifestHash, pretendedHash, algo)for each file
in archive
Created with Poseidon for UML Community Edition. Not for Commercial Use.
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